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Abstract 
This paper explores the relationship between foreign direct investment and 
remittance flows. Using a panel of 79 countries, we estimate a random 
effects model and find a positive and significant relationship between the 
two capital flows. We account for the potential endogeneity of FDI to 
remittances by utilize a two-stage Instrumental Variables approach. These 
findings are indicative of a desire among the emigrant community to 
invest their income earned abroad in their home countries. We also 
explore regional characteristics to examine whether this relationship 
differs across regions. Consequently, we find this effect to be particularly 
important for Sub-Saharan African (SSA) and Latin American and 
Caribbean (LAC) countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Remittances to developing countries in 2013 totaled an estimated $404 billion (World 
Bank, 2014). This amount is equivalent to roughly three times the amount dispersed in official 
development assistance (ODA) and in some countries remittances represent the largest single 
source of foreign exchange. Remittances have been widely regarded as a potential source for 
development financing due to the fact that they tend to be less volatile than other capital flows 
and because they are direct transfers to households. Despite a growing literature into the causes 
and effects of remittances, relatively little research has examined the relationship between 
remittances and other capital flows. Given the relative size and importance of remittances vis-à-
vis other capital flows, we contribute to this literature by examining how foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows impact remittances into a country. 
Understanding the relationship between remittances and other capital flows is important 
for several reasons. First, it provides further evidence into the literature on motivations to remit. 
If remittances and FDI move in the same direction, it would suggest that remittances are being 
channeled toward investment activities. If, on the other hand, remittances are negatively related 
to FDI flows, then it may indicate that remittances are more compensatory in nature, or possibly 
that FDI is crowding out migrant investment. Further, if remittances and FDI are related, then 
policies directed toward attracting FDI may indirectly affect remittances, and vice-versa. In 
particular, if FDI and remittances are complements, then policies designed to attract FDI will 
benefit both foreign investors and emigrants. From a development perspective, channeling 
remittances toward investment may represent the best path for remittances to have a positive 
impact on the receiving economy. However, if FDI and remittances are substitutes, then 
increases in FDI may adversely impact emigrants, as they may crowd out remittances. We 
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explore this relationship on a panel of 79 countries over 1980-2010 using a random effects 
Instrumental Variable (IV) model, where we focus on how FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP 
impacts the amount of remittance inflows as a percentage of GDP. We control for a range of 
variables that others have found to be important for the flow of remittances across borders. Our 
findings indicate a positive relationship between remittance flows and FDI flows, perhaps 
suggesting a desire by emigrants to invest in their home countries as opportunities arise.  
2. Literature Review 
Three strands of the remittance literature are of particular importance to this study. The 
first is the literature related to the motivation to remit, specifically whether remittances are used 
for investment purposes. The second is the literature on the macroeconomic determinants of 
remittances flows. The third is the literature on the relationship between remittances and other 
capital flows.  We provide a brief overview of this literature below. 
2.1 Remittances for Investment 
In their seminal paper, Lucas and Stark (1985) outline three potential motivations for 
sending remittances: pure altruism, pure self-interest, and tempered altruism or enlightened self-
interest. Subsequent empirical research has found evidence of all three motivations under 
varying circumstances.
1
 Remitting for altruistic reasons has been shown to have poverty 
reducing effects, primarily by increasing consumption levels of recipient households.  For our 
purposes, however, self-interest may be more important for the potential for remittances to lead 
to domestic investment.  
Numerous studies have explored the extent to which remittances are invested by 
receiving households. Microeconomic studies have found that remittances are used to increase 
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land holdings, purchase livestock, and invest in small businesses (Adams, 1998; Wouterse and 
Taylor, 2008; Yang, 2008; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2001). Macroeconomic studies exploring the 
relationship between remittances and economic growth have found remittances to be pro-cyclical 
in countries with low levels of financial development (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009; 
Mundaca, 2010). That remittance inflows increase during periods of economic growth may 
indicate that remittances are being channeled toward investment in the absence of formal credit 
markets, thus overcoming liquidity constraints. Microeconomic evidence also supports this 
claim. Coon (2014) matches household survey data with community-level financial development 
indicators and finds that Mexican households in communities without banks are significantly 
more likely to use remittances for asset accumulation and to invest in productive activities. 
Not all researchers are convinced that remittances are being used to overcome liquidity 
constraints. Clemens and Ogden (2014) argue that it is unlikely that migration occurs because of 
credit constraints, since migration is itself a costly investment.  They argue instead that migration 
is more likely to arise due to a lack of investment opportunities in the home community. While it 
is indeed true that households may choose to migrate because migration yields the highest return 
on investment, it is also true that households are limited in their ability to continue to invest in 
migration by the number of household members who are able to migrate. Thus, given that 
migration has occurred, as investment opportunities arise in the home community, remittances 
may be a more attractive method of financing these investments, even if the return on these 
investments is lower than the potential return to migration. 
 To the extent that emigrants have a desire to invest in their home country, policy briefs 
by Terrazas (2010) and Rodriguez-Montemayor (2012) explore why “Diaspora Direct 
Investment” (DDI) may be more desirable than other investment inflows. Emigrants investing in 
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their home countries may have country-specific knowledge relating to culture and business 
climate that may make their ventures more successful than similar projects led by foreign 
investors. Also, since they have a sentimental attachment to their home countries, they may be 
less inclined to disinvest during economic downturns, which can help reduce economic 
instability. Although DDI differs from remittances in the sense that DDI refers to investments by 
firms owned and/or operated by emigrants in their host country, similar arguments may apply 
equally to invested remittance income by households. Terrazas (2010) and Rodriquez-
Montemayor (2012) provide examples of the types of DDI that occur but specific DDI data are 
not available to the extent that remittance flows are available. 
2.2 Determinants of Remittance Flows 
 Several studies have explored the macroeconomic determinants of remittance flows, 
primarily to explore the extent to which domestic macroeconomic policy can increase the inward 
flow of remittance income. A primary determinant in these studies is the level of economic 
activity, measured as GDP per capita, in the home country. The core question of this line of 
research is whether remittances are used for consumption (altruistic motives) or investment (self-
interested motives). If remittances fall as GDP increases, then, it is argued, remittances are 
compensatory in nature. Thus, as incomes increase, fewer remittances are needed to subsidize (or 
cushion) consumption. If, on the other hand, remittances increase with GDP, then that is an 
indicator that remittances are pursuing investment opportunities. Empirical evidence is 
somewhat mixed. Chami et al. (2005), using a sample of 113 countries over a 28 year period, 
show that remittances tend to decline with economic growth, which would indicate remittances 
are compensatory in nature. On the other hand, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2006) and Mundaca 
(2009) find that remittances tend to be pro-cyclical in countries with lower levels of financial 
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development, and are therefore likely pursuing investment opportunities. Freund and Spatafora 
(2008) find that after controlling for transaction costs of sending remittances, remittances tend to 
increase with home country income, thus providing further evidence that remittances are pro-
cyclical in nature.  Adenutsi (2014), using a sample of 36 Sub-Saharan African countries over 29 
years, finds that rising income in the home country leads to an increase in remittances from 
permanent migrants, but decreases remittances from temporary migrants. These findings seem to 
indicate that permanent migrants remit for self-interested (investment) purposes, while 
temporary migrants tend to be more altruistic.  
 The effect of domestic financial development on remittance flows is also uncertain in the 
empirical literature. On one hand, remittances can be used to overcome liquidity constraints in 
the home country, which would cause remittances to decline with financial development 
(Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2006; Mundaca, 2009; Ramirez and Sharma, 2009). On the other 
hand, increased financial development can reduce the transaction costs of sending remittances, 
thereby increasing remittance flows (Freund and Spatafora, 2008; Ezeoha, 2013). Adenutsi 
(2014) again finds different effects for temporary and permanent migrants.  
 We use this literature to help us choose the baseline determinants of remittances.  We 
then consider the role that FDI inflows may play in addition to these baseline determinants.  The 
main set of determinants of remittance flows include the stock of migrants (Freund and 
Spatafora, 2008), host country income (Freund and Spatafora, 2008; Adenutsi, 2014), and 
exchange rates (Alleyne et al., 2008; Adenutsi, 2014).  Others have also considered money 
supply (Vargas-Silva and Huang, 2006) and interest rate differentials (El-Sakka and McNabb, 
1999; Aydas et al., 2005). 
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2.3 Remittances and Other Capital Flows 
 The relationship between remittances and other capital flows is arguably one of the most 
understudied topics in the remittance literature. While it is widely noted that remittance flows are 
more stable than other capital flows (Ratha, 2003), very little research has looked into how these 
flows are related. The bulk of empirical research that studies remittances and other capital flows 
usually explores the flows’ impact on some other variable. For instance, Hossain (2014) 
examines the extent to which FDI and remittances impact domestic savings rates. Wang and 
Wong (2011) examine how inward FDI and remittances affect out-migration. While they find 
that FDI reduces out-migration among the more educated population, their study stops short of 
exploring how that might affect future remittance streams.  
 In one of the few studies to test the relationship between remittances and other capital 
flows, Buch and Kuckulenz (2010) find no significant relationship between remittances and 
private capital inflows for 87 developing countries between 1970 and 2000. They do find, 
however, a positive correlation between remittances and official capital inflows. They 
empirically examine the determinants of these three individual capital flows: remittances, private 
capital flows, and official development assistance. However, they exclude the alternative flows 
in the set of possible determinants for each. Thus, it is unclear whether and how one flow is 
affecting the others. Our paper fills this gap by considering explicitly the interaction between 
remittances and private capital flows in the form of FDI inflows. We also examine how official 
capital flows may affect this relationship. 
 Basnet and Upadhyaya (2014) explore the possibility that remittances may help attract 
FDI. Their hypothesis is that remittances lead to increases in human capital, which in turn 
attracts FDI. Their results, however, are mixed, and appear to be driven by regional differences. 
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On their full sample of 35 middle-income countries between 1980 and 2010, they find no 
significant effect of lagged remittances on FDI. When divided by regions, they find no 
significant effect for Latin America. However, they find a negative effect of remittances on FDI 
for Asian and Pacific countries and a positive effect for African countries. Given this evidence, 
we explore further the relationship between FDI and remittances by explicitly modeling the 
impact of FDI flows on remittance flows. To account for the potential endogeneity of FDI to 
remittances, we utilize a two-stage Instrumental Variables approach. We also explore regional 
characteristics to examine whether this relationship differs across regions. 
3. Model and Data 
We examine the broad question of whether aggregate inward FDI flows and inward 
remittance flows are related for country i. To get at this question, we employ an unbalanced 
panel of 79 countries for the years 1980-2010 to estimate the following model 
                                        
where     is the log of remittances received by country   as a percentage of GDP in year  . FDI is 
the log of net FDI inflows to country i in year t.        includes lagged measures of capital 
account and trade openness.     is a vector of control variables that have been found to be the 
primary determinants of remittances. These controls include the log of GDP per capita in the 
home (remittance receiving) country and the log of GDP per capita in the main destination 
country for each remittance-recipient country’s emigrants. We also consider a squared GDP per 
capita term to capture any nonlinearities and the first difference in GDP per capita to capture 
changes in GDP. Other controls include the real effective exchange rate index (2005=100) and 
the emigrant stock as a share of the population. As a measure of domestic financial development, 
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we also include domestic credit to the private sector by banks, measured as a percentage of GDP. 
The natural log is taken for all measures of GDP and the real exchange rate.  
 We estimate the model first using a random effect GLS model as a baseline. There may 
be a concern that remittances attract FDI flows (as in the Basnet and Upadhyaya (2014) paper) so 
that FDI may be endogenous. To control for the potential endogeneity of FDI we estimate a two-
stage IV model using lagged FDI inflows as instruments. The two-stage random effect GLS 
model with lagged FDI flows as instruments provides our main estimation results. 
Data for remittances and emigrant stock come from the World Bank’s Migration and 
Remittances Fact Book (2011), and are measured as aggregates for each country. Aggregate 
remittance inflows to each country i over each year are reported in dollars by the World Bank. 
The accumulated emigrant stock is measured as number of people at the end of the year. For our 
analysis we normalize remittance flows and emigrant stock by converting them to shares of GDP 
and population, respectively. Capital account openness is the KAOPEN measure as calculated by 
Chinn and Ito (2006) while trade openness is calculated as exports plus imports relative to GDP 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2011). Both capital account openness 
and trade openness are expected to be positively related to remittances as the flow of funds are 
less restricted under higher openness measures. The remaining variables come from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (2011), including the real exchange rate, domestic credit 
to the banking sector, and measures of GDP per capita. GDP measures in the home and host 
countries are measured in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms. 
Table 1 provides a list of the countries by region included in the estimation. Summary 
statistics for key variables of interest are reported in Table 2 as averages over countries and 
years. Remittances as a percentage of GDP range from nearly zero (0.00003% for Uruguay in 
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1983) to as much as 106% (Lesotho in 1982). However, 90 percent of the observations range 
from 0.03% to 9.5% of GDP. Similarly, net inflows of FDI range from -16% to 145% of GDP 
with 90 percent of the observations between 0.002% and 12% of GDP.  Note that net inflows of 
FDI are calculated as FDI inflows to country i (i.e., net inward direct investment from the rest of 
the world to country i). Any negative values for FDI inflows can be described as the reversal of 
previous flows. We do not account for FDI outflows (i.e., outward direct investment from 
country i). To account for negative values of FDI we estimate two models. The first model uses 
only the log of positive values of net FDI inflows, denoted FDI1 below. In the second model we 
take the log of the absolute value of net FDI inflows and use the negative of this value for any 
observations with FDI<0. We denote this second measure as FDI2. We show results using both 
FDI1 and FDI2 to examine whether the relationship with remittance flows is sensitive to these 
negative values.  
Since emigrant stock data is only available on a decennial basis, our measure of emigrant 
stock as a share of the population is taken at the beginning of each decade, i.e.          
                 , where  is the emigrant stock of country i as a share of the population. 
GDP of the home country is measured on a per capita (PPP) basis each year. GDP of the main 
host country is the GDP per capita (PPP) of the country with the largest emigrant population at 
the beginning of the decade. We also include a squared GDP term to consider any nonlinearities.  
Remittances may follow an inverted U pattern with respect to home country income. This is 
consistent with the theory of the “migration hump” (de Haas 2010). That is, extremely poor 
countries may lack the ability to send migrants abroad, and may lack the necessary infrastructure 
(postal service, banking systems, wire transfer agencies, etc.) to receive remittances. As incomes 
 10 
rise, these constraints are relaxed and remittances increase. Eventually incomes become large 
enough that migration and remittances are no longer necessary, and remittances decline. 
4. Results 
4.1 Baseline Results 
Results of our estimation are presented in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 report the results of 
the random effects estimation. The coefficients for both measures of FDI are positive, but only 
significant in Column 1, which includes only non-negative values of net FDI inflows. This 
indicates that remittances and FDI tend to follow similar flow patterns and that diasporas may be 
seeking to capitalize on investment opportunities in their home countries. Columns 3 and 4 
present estimates of the IV model, which controls for the potential endogeneity of FDI, and is 
thus our preferred specification. The coefficient estimates on both FDI measures are statistically 
significant and positive. The coefficient estimates are also larger than in columns 1 and 2, 
indicating that potential endogeneity may bias the result downward.  
Columns 5 and 6 include regional dummies and use the random effects IV model to 
examine whether the results differ across geographical regions. The regions considered are Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), and all other countries. The results are robust to the 
inclusion of such dummies with somewhat higher coefficients on the FDI measures. The 
dummies for LAC and SSA are significant and negative, indicating that these regions receive 
less remittances overall. Thus, while Africa has a higher mean remittance to GDP ratio in the 
summary statistics, the negative dummy coefficient says that there are other regional 
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characteristics that lower the average remittances, relative to the other regional groups.
2
 Based 
on these results, we subdivide our sample and run the regressions separately below on each 
region. 
Taken together, the coefficient estimates in Table 3 indicate that the relationship between 
FDI and remittance flows is positive and in the range of 0.065 to 0.176. Given the log-log nature 
of the regressions, these estimates can be interpreted as elasticities. Consequently, a 10% rise in 
FDI flows to country i is associated with a 0.65% to 1.76% increase in remittances. Based on 
mean remittance flows of 3.3% of GDP across all years and countries, this coefficient indicates 
an increase in remittance flows relative to GDP of 0.021% to 0.058%. There are three possible 
explanations for what appear to be relatively small magnitudes. The first is a resource constraint. 
While emigrants may be able to recognize investment opportunities and have a desire to invest in 
their home countries, they may not have the ability to mobilize the necessary resources. Second, 
relative to the pool of potential foreign investors, a particular country’s emigrant population is 
likely to be quite small. Given the size of the emigrant population, where the emigrant stock on 
average is 10% of the population, increasing remittances by around ½ percent of GDP might 
represent a significant share of their income and savings, thus indicating a larger mobilization of 
diaspora funds. The third possible explanation is related to the dual nature of remittances 
themselves. While remittances may be used for investment purposes, they are also widely used 
for consumption smoothing. Since FDI tends to be pro-cyclical, increases in FDI will correspond 
to increases in income in the receiving country, thereby reducing the need for sending 
remittances to supplement consumption. Thus, it is possible that remittances may be reallocated 
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 Dropping Lesotho (which has the largest single observation for remittance flows of 106% and 
pulls up the average in the summary statistics) from the baseline regression provides even 
stronger results on the FDI variable with a coefficient of 0.204 (significant at 5%). 
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toward investment, which would not necessarily change the quantity of remittances being sent. 
While this subtlety cannot be tested with the available data, our results are suggestive that further 
research focusing on the specific uses of remittance funds may warrant consideration of 
interactions between remittances and other international financial flows.  
Based on previous literature on the determinants of remittance flows across countries, the 
coefficients on the other control variables generally show the expected signs. Countries that are 
more open to trade and capital have higher remittances relative to GDP. Remittances are 
negatively related to the real effective exchange rate. As the home country faces real currency 
appreciation, emigrants send less since their remittances lose value in the home country. The 
domestic financial development variable, domestic credit to the banking sector, is negative, 
small, and borderline significant, consistent with mixed results in prior literature. The emigrant 
stock (relative to the population) indicates that countries with higher rates of emigration also 
have higher remittance rates.  
We also find that remittances are positively related to the level of GDP per capita in the 
home country as well as changes in home country GDP per capita, indicating that remittances 
tend to be more pro-cyclical in nature (as in Freund and Spatafora, 2008). Thus, remittances may 
be more likely to be used for investment than to be compensatory in nature. The squared GDP 
per capita term indicates that remittances follow an inverted U pattern with respect to home 
country income. Interestingly, GDP per capita and changes in GDP per capita in the main host 
country seem to have little impact on aggregate remittance flows. We have explored different 
combinations of these control variables (in particular leaving out the squared GDP per capita 
term and the first-differenced GDP per capita term). The results for the FDI variables are robust 
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to these different combinations of these control variables, indicating that the relationship 
between remittances and FDI flows are not sensitive to these inclusions. 
4.2 Regional Variation 
Table 4 provides evidence of regional variations in the relationship between remittances 
and FDI. Using the second FDI measure, which includes negative net flows (i.e., the reversal of 
past FDI flows), we estimate the IV model separately for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), East Asia and 
the Pacific (EAP), and all remaining countries (rest-of-the-world or ROW). The coefficient 
estimates are positive and significant for all regions, with the exception of the Middle East and 
North Africa. The coefficient is larger in magnitude for Sub-Saharan Africa, and moderately 
higher for Latin America and the Caribbean, and for East Asia and the Pacific, relative to the rest 
of the world. Thus, FDI flows positively impact remittance flows to Latin America, East Asia, 
and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular. In the baseline regression (columns 5 and 6 of Table 3), 
both the LAC and SSA regional dummies take a negative value, highlighting that these regions 
receive fewer remittances on average. Yet, these are also the two regions that show consistently 
significantly positive impacts of FDI flows on remittance flows. 
Similar to the magnitudes calculated for the overall sample, consider the coefficient for 
the SSA countries of 0.516. As an elasticity, this indicates that a 10% increase in FDI increases 
remittances by 5.16%, which corresponds to an increase in remittance flows relative to GDP of 
0.40%. This larger response in Africa is suggestive that the positive co-movement of FDI and 
remittances may be particularly important where there is less access to formal credit markets.  
On average, the SSA countries receive a larger amount of remittances relative to GDP and also 
have a smaller average value for domestic credit.  
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4.3 Official Development Assistance 
We now explore the inclusion of Official Development Assistance capital flows, which 
are gifts of aid or assistance to the governments of country i, and may include strict guidelines on 
their use or disbursement. Our focus is not directly on how ODA may impact remittances since 
remittances are flowing directly to households, but in how they may impact the relationship 
between FDI and remittances. We might imagine, however, that ODA flows would affect 
remittances if both are predominantly flowing to poorer countries. In general, the results in Table 
5 show that the ODA flows are not significant as a determinant of remittance flows, indicating 
that households are not responding directly to the ODA flows in each of the regions. Only for the 
other ODA-recipient sample in the last column of Table 5 are the ODA flows significant and 
positive for remittances.   
By including ODA we lose a number of countries from our analysis since they do not 
receive ODA flows. In particular, we lose observations from the EAP and the rest-of-the-world 
samples (e.g., OECD countries). For those that remain, the impact of FDI flows on remittances 
are robust for the LAC and SSA regions with the addition of ODA flows, as shown in Table 5. 
We report results using FDI2 (which accounts for the negative FDI flows into a country), where 
the coefficient on FDI for remittances for the LAC is 0.296 and 0.433 for the SSA countries 
(compared to 0.299 and 0.516 without ODA included).
3
 The FDI coefficient is not significant for 
the MENA countries in either Table 4 or 5.  
The coefficient on FDI for the EAP countries is insignificant in Table 5 with ODA 
included compared to a significant positive value in Table 4, but the sample size falls from 7 
countries to 5 countries when the ODA variable is included. We have also explored this same 
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 The results are similar using the FDI1 variable. 
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smaller sample for the EAP and other ODA-recipient countries without the ODA variable 
included in the regression. The coefficient estimates are similar to those reported in Table 5, thus 
indicating that the lack of significance and change in value is due to the smaller sample rather 
than to the inclusion of the ODA variable. Overall, then, the inclusion of ODA does not change 
our main conclusion that FDI inflows positively impact remittance inflows. 
5. Conclusion 
The results presented above indicate a positive relationship between FDI and remittance 
flows. We interpret this relationship to indicate the desire among migrants to invest in their home 
countries. While there is a clear positive relationship between these two flows, the estimated 
coefficients show that remittance flows are inelastic with respect to FDI flows. That is, the 
change in remittance flows is small relative to the change in FDI flows. As mentioned above, this 
may be due to the inability of emigrants to mobilize capital as quickly as other investors, in 
which case effective policy can help increase emigrant investment in their home countries. It also 
may be the case that remittances are simply being reallocated from consumption to investment, 
and our results are underestimating the true willingness of emigrants to invest in their home 
countries. 
Further research could focus on the individual uses of remittances and how these choices 
are affected by not only the access to domestic credit but also to international capital flows, such 
as FDI. Our aggregate data cannot show the individual choices of emigrants but are suggestive 
that the different types of capital flows are related. In particular, the remittance flows here are 
positively related to FDI flows and to measures of openness in both trade and financial flows. 
Thus, from a policy prescription standpoint, increases in remittance flows may accompany 
continued openness and policies that attract FDI. We do not find any evidence that FDI flows 
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substitute directly for remittance flows, but instead show that these two types of capital flow 
together. Given prior evidence that remittance flows tend to be less volatile than other capital 
flows (Ratha, 2003), they may provide a more stable form of capital that may remain in a 
country when other types of capital are withdrawn. Better policies to help direct these flows into 
domestic investment may prove fruitful from a development perspective.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: List of Countries by Region 
Middle East  
and North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America and Caribbean East Asia and Pacific Rest of World 
Algeria Burundi Antigua and Barbuda Australia Armenia Italy 
Oman Cameroon Belize China Austria Macedonia 
Sudan Central African Republic Bolivia Fiji Belgium Malta 
Syria Cote d'Ivoire Chile Japan Bulgaria Moldova 
Tunisia Equatorial Guinea Colombia Malaysia Croatia New Zealand 
 
Gabon Costa Rica Tonga Cyprus Norway 
 
Gambia, The Dominica Vietnam Czech Republic Poland 
 
Ghana Dominican Republic 
 
Denmark Portugal 
 
Lesotho Ecuador 
 
Finland Russia 
 
Mozambique Guyana 
 
France Slovak Rep 
 
Niger Mexico 
 
Georgia Slovenia 
 
Rwanda Nicaragua 
 
Germany Spain 
 
Senegal Panama 
 
Greece Sri Lanka 
  
Paraguay 
 
Hungary Switzerland 
  
Peru 
 
Iceland Turkey 
  
St. Lucia 
 
Iran Ukraine 
  
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
 
Ireland United States 
  
Trinidad and Tobago 
 
Israel 
 
    Uruguay       
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Table 2: Summary Statistics       
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
All Countries 
     Remittances (% of GDP) 1769 3.261564 8.855925 2.89E-05 106.4789 
FDI (% of GDP) 1769 3.709297 6.313829 -16.0607 145.202 
KAOPEN 1769 0.290422 1.54228 -1.85564 2.45573 
Trade Openness [(EX+IM)/GDP] 1769 79.62227 41.95674 6.320343 280.361 
Real Exchange Rate (2005=100) 1769 3170.619 104082.8 19.5275 4342879 
Domestic Credit to Banking Sector (% of GDP) 1769 68.64498 54.86691 -20.8737 328.9902 
Emigrant Stock (% of population) 1769 10.08224 11.67044 0.393005 62.58882 
GDP per capita (PPP) 1769 12569.65 10670.19 372.6397 48402.64 
Main Host GDP per capita (PPP) 1769 25152.12 14055.86 560.5077 120037.7 
Latin American and Caribbean 
     Remittances (% of GDP) 450 2.978741 3.075511 2.89E-05 24.4022 
FDI (% of GDP) 450 5.143263 5.33509 -12.2084 39.80923 
KAOPEN 449 0.387468 1.49894 -1.85564 2.45573 
Trade Openness [(EX+IM)/GDP] 449 89.30288 46.40512 23.34449 280.361 
Real Exchange Rate (2005=100) 450 114.7638 76.60498 61.14532 1018.028 
Domestic Credit to Banking Sector (% of GDP) 450 54.47583 33.66471 -1.53483 269.5832 
Emigrant Stock (% of population) 450 16.04699 17.48373 1.337955 62.58882 
GDP per capita (PPP) 450 7556.253 4013.274 1644.422 24150.88 
Main Host GDP per capita (PPP) 450 30494.00 11791.64 7458.294 43635.59 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
     Remittances (% of GDP) 255 8.265813 20.60266 0.000481 106.4789 
FDI (% of GDP) 255 3.281467 11.19175 -8.58943 145.202 
KAOPEN 255 -0.82935 0.795413 -1.85564 2.45573 
Trade Openness [(EX+IM)/GDP] 254 74.09383 40.88767 6.320343 237.9944 
Real Exchange Rate (2005=100) 255 21326.27 273896.7 19.5275 4342879 
Domestic Credit to Banking Sector (% of GDP) 255 20.40256 13.28139 -20.8737 65.70037 
Emigrant Stock (% of population) 255 4.183324 4.486878 0.867312 20.56551 
GDP per capita (PPP) 255 2311.209 3698.403 372.6397 17441.69 
Main Host GDP per capita (PPP) 255 5904.37 7768.56 560.5077 29483.66 
Middle East and North Africa 
     Remittances (% of GDP) 139 2.330361 1.76093 0.064411 6.934043 
FDI (% of GDP) 139 1.872339 2.52443 -0.25087 12.50425 
KAOPEN 138 -0.57325 1.523041 -1.85564 2.45573 
Trade Openness [(EX+IM)/GDP] 138 63.08993 25.9187 11.08743 115.7047 
Real Exchange Rate (2005=100) 139 123.2961 67.90489 86.39595 448.525 
Domestic Credit to Banking Sector (% of GDP) 139 41.57308 27.04523 -12.623 106.867 
Emigrant Stock (% of population) 139 6.041849 3.394034 1.659911 12.52331 
GDP per capita (PPP) 139 7062.368 6041.784 879.3794 24646.04 
Main Host GDP per capita (PPP) 139 33729.77 20942.11 5249.497 120037.7 
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East Asia and Pacific 
     Remittances (% of GDP) 159 3.363304 7.21631 0.014367 36.49304 
FDI (% of GDP) 159 2.871219 2.656274 -3.53528 11.9315 
KAOPEN 159 0.306596 1.475463 -1.85564 2.45573 
Trade Openness [(EX+IM)/GDP] 159 82.07325 57.05117 15.92399 220.4068 
Real Exchange Rate (2005=100) 159 109.5059 21.52785 72.2731 201.7008 
Domestic Credit to Banking Sector (% of GDP) 159 115.7839 80.26091 26.48476 328.9902 
Emigrant Stock (% of population) 159 6.861545 11.61905 0.393005 45.67485 
GDP per capita (PPP) 159 12329.27 11232.23 814.0746 34601.75 
Main Host GDP per capita (PPP) 159 31003.09 7829.837 17304.5 52169.96 
Rest of World 
     Remittances (% of GDP) 764 1.904425 3.61804 0.001912 34.67026 
FDI (% of GDP) 764 3.520527 5.406539 -16.0607 51.89585 
KAOPEN 764 0.8808 1.501085 -1.85564 2.45573 
Trade Openness [(EX+IM)/GDP] 763 79.18675 36.50591 17.18601 188.9775 
Real Exchange Rate (2005=100) 764 110.2099 84.71197 37.51198 1123.842 
Domestic Credit to Banking Sector (% of GDP) 764 88.25956 53.89448 5.559478 315.7515 
Emigrant Stock (% of population) 764 9.959029 7.817467 0.71348 33.10048 
GDP per capita (PPP) 764 20020.78 10283.18 1619.869 48402.64 
Main Host GDP per capita (PPP) 764 25627.94 10104.35 910.8402 43635.59 
 
Years and number of countries included (averages over countries and years). 
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Table 3: Panel Estimates: Dep. Var. = Remittances (% of GDP) 
 Random Effect GLS 2SGLS Random Effect IV 2SGLS Random Effect IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln[FDI1 (% of GDP)] 0.065
***  0.113***  0.127***  
 (0.019)  (0.036)  (0.036)  
       
Ln[FDI2 (% of GDP)]  0.023  0.152
**  0.176** 
  (0.016)  (0.075)  (0.077) 
       
KAOPENt-1 0.173
*** 0.192*** 0.167*** 0.174*** 0.173*** 0.178*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) 
       
Trade Opennesst-1 0.009
*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
       
Ln[Real Exchange 
Rate] 
-0.112*** -0.142*** -0.085* -0.118*** -0.081* -0.112*** 
 (0.040) (0.037) (0.047) (0.040) (0.048) (0.041) 
       
Domestic Credit to  -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 
Banking Sector (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Emigrant Stock 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
Ln[GDP per capita] 5.081*** 5.193*** 5.067*** 5.186*** 4.849*** 4.996*** 
 (0.809) (0.801) (0.811) (0.805) (0.841) (0.843) 
       
Ln[(GDP per capita)2] -0.304*** -0.309*** -0.307*** -0.316*** -0.302*** -0.313*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.049) 
       
Δ(GDP per capita) 1.621*** 1.572*** 1.451** 1.135* 1.394** 1.046* 
 (0.577) (0.556) (0.600) (0.619) (0.604) (0.628) 
       
Ln[Main Host GDP  
per capita] 
-0.123* -0.098 -0.111 -0.096 -0.126* -0.106 
 (0.066) (0.063) (0.070) (0.064) (0.072) (0.066) 
       
Δ(Main Host GDP 0.219* 0.100 0.213* 0.111 0.228* 0.122 
per capita) (0.117) (0.108) (0.119) (0.110) (0.121) (0.112) 
       
       
East Asia     -0.144 -0.211 
and Pacific     (0.503) (0.495) 
       
Latin America     -0.640* -0.721** 
and Caribbean     (0.359) (0.362) 
       
Sub-Saharan     -0.921** -0.935* 
Africa     (0.464) (0.481) 
       
Middle East     0.700 0.608 
and North Africa     (0.576) (0.566) 
       
Constant -20.280*** -20.946*** -20.119*** -20.435*** -18.280*** -18.677*** 
 (3.448) (3.406) (3.448) (3.431) (3.667) (3.705) 
N 1688 1767 1625 1759 1625 1759 
χ2 262.550 274.000 250.289 273.920 263.219 282.848 
p(χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses; Instrumented Variables = FDI in columns 3-6. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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Table 4: Regional Analysis - 2SGLS Random Effects IV Panel Estimates:  
Dep. Var. = Remittances (% of GDP); Instrumented Variables = FDI 
 LAC SSA MENA EAP ROW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln[FDI2 (% of GDP)] 0.299
**
 0.516
*
 0.015 0.239
***
 0.157* 
 (0.150) (0.292) (0.125) (0.087) (0.086) 
      
KAOPENt-1 0.413
***
 0.153 0.183 -0.024 0.033 
 (0.049) (0.148) (0.145) (0.080) (0.032) 
      
Trade Opennesst-1 0.004 0.015
**
 0.016
*
 -0.008
***
 0.007*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) 
      
Ln[Real Exchange Rate] -0.108 -0.092 -0.397 1.010
**
 0.224** 
 (0.223) (0.068) (0.266) (0.396) (0.092) 
      
Domestic Credit to  -0.005
**
 0.001 0.004 -0.017
***
 -0.001 
Banking Sector (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
      
Emigrant Stock 0.002 0.025 -0.084 0.069
***
 0.050*** 
 (0.008) (0.046) (0.063) (0.006) (0.011) 
      
Ln[GDP per capita] 4.471 -1.999 8.962
***
 7.381
***
 2.474 
 (4.513) (5.099) (1.513) (1.541) (1.659) 
      
Ln[(GDP per capita)2] -0.299 0.036 -0.586
***
 -0.422
***
 -0.170* 
 (0.253) (0.324) (0.093) (0.088) (0.093) 
      
Δ(GDP per capita) -0.400 0.489 0.855 -5.494
***
 0.967 
 (1.433) (1.870) (1.215) (1.901) (0.873) 
      
Ln[Main Host GDP  
per capita] 
0.873
***
 -0.381
***
 -0.525 3.586
***
 0.031 
 (0.296) (0.125) (0.416) (0.414) (0.131) 
      
Δ(Main Host GDP -0.449 0.305 0.857
*
 -2.544 -0.209 
per capita) (0.466) (0.192) (0.510) (2.110) (0.221) 
      
Constant -24.975 13.897 -26.273
***
 -71.678
***
 -10.697 
 (20.443) (20.057) (9.386) (8.961) (7.123) 
N 450 253 138 159 759 
Countries 19 13 5 7 35 
χ2 193.803 60.231 583.771 1143.081 100.365 
p(χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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Table 5: 2SGLS Random Effects IV Panel Estimates by Region: Dep. Var. = Remittances (% of 
GDP); Instrumented Variables = FDI and ODA Inflows 
 All ODA 
Recipients 
LAC SSA MENA EAP Other ODA 
Recipients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln[FDI2 (% of GDP)] 0.080 0.296
* 0.433** 0.021 -0.158 0.040 
 (0.104) (0.158) (0.194) (0.121) (0.259) (0.110) 
       
Ln[ODA (% of GDP)] 0.082 0.009 0.042 0.033 0.096 0.249* 
 (0.100) (0.283) (0.325) (0.133) (0.195) (0.140) 
       
KAOPENt-1 0.270
*** 0.414*** 0.400** 0.169 -0.196 0.086 
 (0.037) (0.054) (0.161) (0.143) (0.123) (0.074) 
       
Trade Opennesst-1 0.007
*** 0.004 0.016*** 0.016* 0.005 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) 
       
Ln[Real Exchange  -0.180*** -0.105 -0.118 -0.368 1.529*** 0.495 
Rate] (0.047) (0.276) (0.080) (0.269) (0.410) (0.344) 
       
Domestic Credit to  -0.001 -0.005* -0.006 0.004 -0.004 0.000 
Banking Sector (0.001) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
       
Emigrant Stock 0.024*** 0.002 0.147*** -0.084 0.084*** 0.010 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.043) (0.063) (0.014) (0.017) 
       
Ln[GDP per capita] 6.646*** 4.574 5.614** 9.024*** 21.439*** 11.049*** 
 (1.114) (5.856) (2.550) (1.510) (2.949) (2.697) 
       
Ln[(GDP per capita)2] -0.395*** -0.303 -0.427*** -0.586*** -1.329*** -0.665*** 
 (0.068) (0.309) (0.154) (0.093) (0.195) (0.157) 
       
Δ(GDP per capita) 1.037 -0.429 -1.887 0.870 -1.375 0.998 
 (0.794) (1.586) (2.519) (1.218) (2.252) (1.293) 
       
Ln[Main Host GDP -0.124* 0.863** 0.017 -0.547 3.165*** 0.221 
per capita] (0.073) (0.365) (0.145) (0.447) (0.354) (0.211) 
       
Δ(Main Host GDP 0.159 -0.445 -0.078 0.916 3.534* -0.178 
per capita) (0.125) (0.504) (0.250) (0.610) (1.942) (0.352) 
       
Constant -26.408*** -25.495 -19.291* -26.694*** -126.411*** -49.693*** 
 (4.673) (29.857) (10.878) (9.202) (12.636) (11.010) 
N 1235 450 253 138 105 289 
chi2 248.908 193.450 345.703 580.988 1064.816 83.512 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
